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HOSPITAL MALPRACTICE PREVENTION
Jonathan Kahn*
Liability for hospital-caused patient injuries has evoked new in-
dustry responses in malpractice prevention. In this Article, the
author reviews three major judicial decisions that have shaped
these responses, and discusses the significant issues that hospitals
must resolve when designing programs to prevent patient injuries.
Mr. Kahn concludes that as adoption of such programs becomes
widespread, the failure to establish internal systems of malpractice
prevention could result in further risk of liability.
Hospital liability for faulty patient care is a risk that any hospital
must closely and carefully consider. In 1976 there were about one
billion contacts between the nation's approximately three million hos-
pital personnel and hospital patients. Each of these personnel per-
formed daily at least one act that, if negligently performed, would
have put a patient's life and limb in jeopardy and possibly would have
resulted in hospital liability.' One means for dealing with the om-
nipresent risk of liability is a comprehensive program that seeks to
reduce or eliminate "the uncertainty of financial loss resulting from
risks of a fortuitous nature." 2  This type of program often is termed
"risk management." Through it, an institution seeks, first, to identify
and classify loss risks and their potential frequency and severity. Sec-
ond, it acts to eliminate or avoid identified risks through loss and
liability prevention efforts. Third, it undertakes to select the most
effective and economical means of pre-planning for a source of funds
to use in case loss elimination and reduction are not fully effective. 3
This Article is concerned only with one aspect of risk management,
that is, measures taken before an accident to reduce patient injuries
from faulty care.4 Recent developments in hospital corporate liability
* A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University of Chicago. This Article is a revised version
of a paper given on June 14-15, 1977 at the Seventh Annual Meeting and Conference of the
American Society for Health Manpower Education and Training of the American Hospital As-
sociation in Chicago.
1. Yet it should be noted that, for 1976, there probably will have been only between
40,000 and 50,000 malpractice claims filed against hospitals. Interview with James L. Groves,
Risk Manager, American Hospital Association, reported in Hospitals Cautioned to Identify
Areas of Problems Before Incident Occurs, 10 FED. AM. Hosp. REv. 37-38 (Feb. 1977).
2. 1 TOPiCs IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING: RISK MANAGEMENT 3 (No. 4, 1975).
3. id.
4. Such measures are being utilized increasingly by hospitals and are associated with the
trend toward hospital self-insurance and formation of "captive" insurers. In 1974 and 1975, as
malpractice insurance losses began to soar, some insurers began to more than double their
rates, with some rates increasing tenfold. Some insurers simply stopped offering coverage. As a
result, there was an alarming escalation in premiums paid. In 1974 the nation's more than 6,000
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are reviewed and analyzed, with particular attention to the legal re-
sponsibilities of hospitals to supervise medical staff that are not di-
rectly employed by the hospital. Then, turning to the practical
methods that hospitals could adopt to fulfill these responsibilities,
specific areas that a hospital should address in designing a malpractice
hospitals (excluding those operated by the Veterans Administration) paid approximately
$350,000,000 in malpractice premiums, and, in 1976, approximately $750,000,000. This year
total outlays will climb to around $1,000,000,000. Many hospitals began funding for full or
partial self-insurance; some grouped together with other hospitals to form their own insurance
companies. At the same time many of these hospitals and others began adopting patient injury
prevention programs to reduce potential liability and thereby lower insurance costs. Meyer,
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis May End Up Improving Hospital Care, Wall St. J., Dec.
27, 1976, at 2, cols. 2-3. Cf. Ingrassia, Problems of Insuring Medical Malpractice Show Signs of
Abating, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1977, at 1, col. 1. In fact, such programs had previously been
strongly endorsed in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE REPORT] 61-63 (1973); cf. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT APPENDIX 497, 564-65,
567-68, 571, 577-79, 580, 585, 596, 599, 600-05 (description of some of the loss control pro-
grams then in existence). Currently, hospital associations in eight states (California, Louisiana,
Maryland, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas) are helping member hospitals im-
plement patient injury prevention programs; three states (Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan)
have plans to develop such programs but are not utilizing the direct assistance of the state
hospital association. J. ASHBY, JR. & S. PEARSON, A STUDY OF PATIENT INJURY PREVENTION
PROGRAMS §§ B.1-B.4 (1976).
An informal telephone survey, taken by the DePaul Law Review in August, 1977, of fifteen
Chicago metropolitan area hospitals provides empirical evidence of the trend toward adoption of
malpractice prevention programs. The survey consisted of three questions: (1) Does the hospital
have such a program? (2) If so, how is it organized and operated? (3) Does the hospital carry
professional liability (malpractice) insurance, or is it self-insured?
Generally, the results indicate that the city's teaching or public institutions (the hospi-
tals surveyed having between 600 and 1400 beds, except one with just over 250 beds;
AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO THIE HEALTH CARE FIELD 67-69 (1977)) have or
will soon become fully or partially self-insured. Accordingly, five of the seven have patient
injury prevention programs in order to obtain reimbursement under the medicare regulations
for the costs of self-insurance. See note 51 infra. A sixth stated that eventually a self-insurance
program would be necessary and that, at present, it had an informal risk management program
run by the administration. The last hospital refused to say anything more than that it was in the
process of setting up such a program. In addition, the organization and operation of the pro-
grams tended to vary considerably, with two of the hospitals delegating management of the
program to an outside company, one maintaining an in-house risk manager, and the others
adopting a wide variety of approaches.
By comparison, five of the eight generally smaller community hospitals (all eight with under
300 beds, except a large suburban hospital having over 800 beds, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCI-
ATION, GUIDE TO THE HEALTH CARE FIELD 67-69, 73 (1977)) indicated that they could still
afford their liability insurance premiums and had made no effort to establish partial or full
self-insurance. Therefore, their attention had not been directed to establishing additional safety
programs or reorganizing existing ones in order to comply with the medicare reimbursement
regulations. Only two hospitals stated that they were funding for self-insurance. (One refused to
provide any specific information.) Yet the seven responding community hospitals had some form
of program to monitor medical staff performance and reduce patient injuries. Two (both having
some form of self-insurance) indicated that they utilized consulting services provided by private
entrepreneurs, one, on-site examinations and reviews provided by its insurance carrier.
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prevention program are pointed out.. Concluding is a cautionary note
that the failure to undertake any such program could result in further
risk of liability.
HOSPITAL CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
Any injury prevention program must be operated in recognition of
the legal principles underlying hospital liability for deficient patient
care. 5 In particular, two important interrelated developments in the
last several years should be noted: departure from the "locality rule,"
and the introduction of liability for non-salaried independent staff.
The traditional rule is that liability will not be imposed upon a
hospital unless it falls short of that degree of care, skill, and diligence
shown by other hospitals in the same community or locality. 6 The
developing doctrine is that the trier of fact, in determining whether a
hospital acted negligently, may consider not only the standards fol-
lowed by other hospitals in the same locality or similar communities,7
but also regulations and guidelines issued by government agencies
and medical and hospital associations. 8 The new test meets the two
major criticisms leveled against the older locality rule: (1) that the
rule enhanced the possibility that a small group by their laxness or
carelessness might establish a local standard below that which the law
should require; (2) that a scarcity of doctors in the community who
are qualified or willing to testify about the local standard of care de-
terred lawsuits against hospitals for negligent injury. 9 The practical
5. See generally D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, 1 MED. MALPRACTICE, 16.01-16.08
(1973); IIA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL: PRINCIPLES OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY (1974) [hereinafter
cited as HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL]; A. HOLDER, MED. MALPRACTICE LAW 200-18 (1975); Kos-
koff & Nadeau, Hospital Liability: The Emerging Standard of Care, 48 CONN. B.J. 305 (1974);
Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship
with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 429 (1973); Comment, The Hospital's Responsibil-
ity for Its Medical Staff: Prospects for Corporate Negligence in California, 8 PAC. L.J. 141
(1977); Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: The Hospital Responsibility for Mal-
practice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Cooper v. Providence Hosp., 272 Ala. 283, 284, 130 So.2d 8, 9 (1961) (con-
sider same community). Cf. Annot., Locality Rule As Governing Hospitals Standard of Care to
Patient and Expert's Competency to Testify Thereto, 36 A.L.R.3d 440 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Avey v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, 210 Kan. 687, 694-99, 442
P.2d 1013, 1020-22 (1968) (similar communities).
8. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 33 1ll.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965),cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d
335 (1972); Gonzales v. Nork & Mercy Hosps., No. 228566 (Super. Ct. of Cal., Sacramento
County, filed Nov. 19, 1973), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Gonzales v.
Nork, 60 Cal. App.3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash.2d 73, 77-78, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967).
The reluctance to testify is often identified as the "conspiracy of silence." C. GREGORY & H.
KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 149 (2d ed. 1969).
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result of eliminating the locality rule is to require hospitals to meet
nationally developed standards of health care.
The second area of change relates to the personnel whose activities
may give rise to hospital liability. In certain jurisdictions hospitals
have been insulated from liability under statutory and common law
rules of governmental and charitable immunity. 10 Where immunity
does not apply, however, hospitals have been held financially respon-
sible for patient injuries resulting from its personnel's acts or omis-
sions. Causes for such liability have included deficiencies in hospital
equipment," physical condition of premises,' 2 supplied drugs, 13 and
the acts or omissions of employed physicians and other employees,
including nurses, interns, orderlies, and student assistants. 14 The
treatments, diagnoses, and occurrences that could give rise to liability
under these traditional doctrines are as wide and varied as is medical
practice itself.' 5 In recent years hospitals have been held accounta-
10. For a state-by-state analysis, see II HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 5, in the chap-
ter entitled Immunities to Suit.
11. IIA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 5, at § 1-1.
12. Id. at § 1-2.
13. Id. at § 1-3.
14. Id. at §§ 2 to 2-3, 1 MED. MALPRACTICE, supra note 5, at 16.05, 16.07.
15. 2 MED. MALPRACTICE, supra note 5, at Appendix A (Malpractice Case Reference List).
Cf. Stivers v. George Washington Univ., 320 F.2d 751, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (allegation of
no informed consent to performance of bilateral arteriogram); Kapuschinsky v. United States, 284
F. Supp. 732, 737-44 (D.S.C. 1966) (staph infection transmitted by federal employee to prema-
ture newborn in government hospital nursery), Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1205 (1964) (hospital's lia-
bility for exposing patient to extraneous infection or contagion); Buzan v. Mercy Hosp., Inc.,
203 So.2d 11, 11-13, 29 A.L.R.3d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (nurse's negligence in assist-
ing operating surgeon; improper counting of sponges resulting in one being left inside patient
after operation); Edgar County Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Paris Hosp., Inc., 57 Ill.2d 298, 306, 312
N.E.2d 259, 263 (1974) (negligence in making hypodermic injection) (this subject is also dis-
cussed at Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 731 (1972)); Ball Mem. Hosp. v. Freeman, 245 Ind. 71, 72, 196
N.E.2d 274, 275, 9 A.L.R.3d 567 (1964) (poisonous fluid labelled as novacaine and injected into
patient); Kastler v. Iowa Methodist Hosp., 193 N.W.2d 98, 99-100 (Ia. 1971) (patient with
history of fainting spells fainted in shower, fell, and cut lip and broke jaw), Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d
1235 (1971) (hospital's liability to patient injured going to or using bathroom facilities); D'Antoni
v. Sara Mayo Hosp., 144 So.2d 643, 645-46 (La. App. 1962), Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1128, 1130-32
(1953) (forgetting to raise side rails of hospital bed); Payne v. Garvey, 264 N.C. 593, 594-95, 142
S.E.2d 159, 160-61 (1965) (injuries resulting from thermometer breaking and glass and mercury
falling into patient's eye), Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1254 (1967) (defective equipment furnished by
hospital for use in diagnosis or treatment of patient); Sheehan v. North Country Community
Hosp., 273 N.Y. 163, 165-66, 7 N.E.2d 28, 29 (1937) (hospital liable to patient for injuries
received while being transported in hospital's ambulance) (subject also discussed at
Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 910, 915-16 (1952)); Milner v. Huntsville Mem. Hosp., 398 S.W.2d 647,
651-52 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966) (heating pad did not have temperature locking device which would
have prevented patient burns), Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 1141 (1973) (injuries allegedly sustained
from absence of particular equipment); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Ctr., 81 Wash.2d 12,
22-25, 29, 32, 499 P.2d 1, 8-9, 12-13, 52 A.L.R.3d 1067 (1972) (no informed consent obtained to
radiation therapy used to treat Hodgkin's disease); Kent v. Whitaker, 58 Wash.2d 569, 570-71,
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ble, not only for the negligence of employee staff physicians but also
for the malpractice of independent, nonsalaried staff who had merely
been given admitting and treating privileges. The emerging trend is
to hold the hospital liable, regardless of the employee or
nonemployee status of the physician, where the hospital has negli-
gently failed to monitor and review medical serices being provided
within its walls. In other words, liability has been imposed because of
the institution's negligence.
The case which sparked these twin developments is Darling v.
Charlesto'n Community Memorial Hospital,16 an Illinois Supreme
Court decision in 1965. In that case, the facts leading to the court's
decision against the hospital were simple and compelling. The plain-
tiff had fractured his leg playing in a college football game. He was
taken to the hospital's emergency room and treated by Dr. Alexan-
der, the on-call physician, who placed the leg in traction and in a
plaster cast. Soon after, the toes, protruding from the cast, became
swollen and dark in color and, eventually, cold and insensitive. Three
days later, Dr. Alexander split the cast with an orthopedic saw and
accidently cut the patient's leg on both sides. Blood and other seep-
age oozed from the cuts. Darling was in the hospital for almost
another two weeks until he was transferred to a different institution
where the new treating physician was an orthopedic surgeon. At-
tempts were made to save the necrotic limb, but to no avail, and the
leg had to be amputated eight inches below the knee. At the trial the
orthopedic surgeon testified that the death of the tissue had resulted
from interference to blood circulation caused by the pressure of a
swelling and hemorrhaging leg against a tightly constructed plaster
cast. 17
Both Dr. Alexander and Charleston Community Hospital were
sued. The plaintiff settled out of court with the doctor for $40,000,
and secured a judgment against the hospital in the amount of
$110,000.18 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hospital's negli-
gence was established by its permitting Dr. Alexander to perform the
orthopedic procedure involved in the case; by not requiring him to
364 P.2d 556, 557 (1961) (failure to prevent self-inflicted death by strangulation using plastic
tube that was part of intravenous feeding apparatus after patient with known suicidal tendencies
was admitted), Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 880 (1974) (liability of hospital other than mental hospital
for suicide of patient).
16. 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
17. For a more complete summary of the testimony offered at trial than offered in the
court's decision, see the appellate court's opinion at 50 I11. App.2d 108, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964).
18. 33 Ill.2d at 328-29, 211 N.E.°2d at 255.
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
update his medical procedures; and by failing, through its medical
staff, to supervise the case adequately, especially since the hospital
had placed him on emergency duty; and by not requiring consultation
by another physician once complications had developed. Moreover,
the plaintiff cited the failure of the hospital's nurses to monitor his
condition with sufficient care and frequency. Either the nurses were
negligent in failing to report the patient's deteriorating systems to the
hospital administrator, he was negligent in not reporting them to the
medical staff, or the staff' was negligent in not taking immediate ac-
tion. Finally, the plaintiff argued that the hospital's own bylaws, state
licensing regulations, and accreditation standards defined the hospi-
tal's duty to the patient, and that violation of them would result in
liability for the patient's injury. 19
The hospital countered with a defense based on the "locality" rule
and argued that the plaintiff had not shown its conduct to be below
the local standard of care. The hospital also contended that it was not
an insurer of the patient's recovery, and that the only duty it owed
patients relating to delivery of care by an individual physician was to
exercise care in the initial selection of its medical staff. "When such
care in the selection of the staff is accomplished, and nothing indi-
cates that a physician so selected is incompetent or that such incompe-
tence should have been discovered, more cannot be expected from
the hospital administration."20
In light of these opposing positions, the court characterized the
issue as the significance- to be afforded "evidence concerning the
community standard of care and diligence, and also the effect to be
given to hospital regulations adopted by the State Department of
Public Health under the Hospital Licensing Act . . . to the Standards
for Hospital Accreditation of the American Association, and to the
bylaws of the defendant."21
The court said that custom is relevant in determining the standard
of care because it indicates what is feasible, suggests a body of know-
ledge of which a party should be aware, and warns of the possible
far-reaching consequences if a court requires a higher standard. 22 But
in response to these considerations, the court quoted the famous
statement by Judge Learned Hand in The T. J. Hooper:23
19. Id. at 329-30, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 329-32, 211 N.E.2d at 256-57.
22. Id. at 331-32, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
23. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
[Vol. 27:23
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Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common pru-
dence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have
unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It may
never set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts
must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so
imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission. 24
The court did not proceed to assess the protective adequacy of
health care industry practices. The quotation from the Hand opinion
was more in the nature of a warning. The court upheld the jury ver-
dict and the judgment against the hospital on the ground that the
evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the hospital had been
negligent. 25
Some courts have erroneously construed Darling as imposing lia-
bility on the hospital only for the negligence of doctors employed by
it and not for the malpractice of staff members merely granted clinical
and admitting privileges. 26  The fact is that the court never specifi-
cally addressed the question of liability for the negligence of non-
employee physicians. The traditional rule is that a hospital can be
held liable only for the negligence of its employees. 27  Under the
24. Id. at 740.
25. 33 Ill.2d at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258. See also Moore v. Board of Trustees, 88 Nev. 207,
495 P.2d 605 (1972), in which the court noted:
Today, in response to demands of the public, the hospital is becoming a com-
munity health center. The purpose of the community hospital is to provide patient
care of the highest possible quality. To implement this duty of providing competent
medical care to the patients, it is the responsibility of the institution to create a
workable system whereby the medical staff of the hospital continually reviews and
evaluates the quality of care being rendered within the institution. The staff must
be organized with a proper structure to carry out the role delegated to it by the
governing body. All powers of the medical staff flow from the board of trustees, and
the staff must be held accountable for its control of quality. The concept of corpo-
rate responsibility for the quality of medical care was forcibly advanced in Darling
v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 lll.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965),
wherein the Illinois Supreme Court held that hospitals and their governing bodies
may be held liable for injuries resulting from imprudent or careless supervision of
members of their medical staffs. The role of the hospital vis-a-vis the community is
changing rapidly. The hospital's role is no longer limited to furnishing of physical
facilities and equipment where a physician treats his private patients and practices
his profession in his own individualized manner.
Id. at 211-12, 495 P.2d at 608.
26. See, e.g., Collins v. Westlake Community Hosp., 12 I11. App.3d 847, 850-52, 299
N.E.2d 326, 328-29 (1973), revd on other grounds, 57 lll.2d 388, 312 N.E.2d 614 (1974);
Lundahl v. Rockford Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 93 I11. App.2d 461, 466-67, 235 N.E.2d 671, 674
(1968).
27. I1A HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 5, at § 2-1. See, e.g., Bulloch County Hosp.
Auth. v. Fowler, 124 Ga. App. 242, 245-47, 183 S.E.2d 586, 589 (1971) (negligence of an
on-call, emergency room physician did not subject institution to liability because staff member
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traditional test, the issue is the hospital's right to control the doctor's
conduct in the performance of his duties.2 8 If there is a right to
control, the doctor is considered an employee; if not, an independent
contractor. Generally, a hospital was not held liable for the wrongful
conduct of a staff physician or surgeon because the doctor had a di-
rect contractual relationship with the patient and, so the argument
ran, the hospital had little, if any, power to control or supervise the
doctor's methods in administering to his patient.2 9
But in other recent decisions the malpractice of staff physicians,
whether they are deemed employees or independent contractors, has
given rise to hospital liability where the hospital is said to have
breached its duty to supervise the selection, retention, and proce-
dures of its staff. Illustrative of the trend is Purcell v. Zimbelman.30
In that case the plaintiff was referred to Tucson General Hospital
after seeing a doctor about bowel troubles. A staff general surgeon,
Dr. Coy Purcell, initially diagnosed the condition as either cancer or
diverticulitis of the large lower bowel, and subsequently performed a
Babcock-Bacon proctosigmoidectomy or "pull-through" operation. As
a result, plaintiff suffered from loss of sexual function, loss of a kid-
ney, permanent colostomy and urinary problems. The testifying doc-
tors were relatively unanimous in their opinion that a different opera-
tive procedure, an anterior resection, should have been performed.
Two other of Purcell's patients with similar diagnoses had undergone
"pull-through" operations where anterior resections were called for.
These two patients, and two others, had sued the physician and the
hospital. All four suits occurred prior to Purcell's treatment of the
plaintiff.
The hospital claimed freedom from liability for Purcell's malpractice
because he operated as an independent contractor and the hospital
had no reason to believe that a specific act of malpractice would take
place. 31 In response, the court noted that the pertinent accreditation
was not an employee); Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 27 Ohio St.2d 242,
253-54, 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (1971).
28. IlA HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 5, at § 2-1. Cf. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 71 (4th ed. 1971); Vanaman v. Milford Mem. Hosp., Inc., 272 A.2d 718,
722 (Del. 1970) (hospital would be liable for negligence of on-call, nonemployee staff surgeon
acting in place of and for an unavailable salaried emergency room physician); Mduba v. Be-
nedictine Hosp., 52 App. Div.2d 450, 452-54, 348 N.Y. S.2d 527, 529-30 (1976) (dictum: hospital
liable regardless of status of emergency room physician where hospital holds itself out to public
as providing emergency room services and where hospital furnishes doctor; patient not bound
by secret limitations contained in private contract between hospital and doctor).
29. IlA HOSPITAL LAw MANUAL, supra note 5 at § 2-1.
30. 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
31. Id. at 83, 500 P.2d at 340-41.
[Vol. 27:23
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standards of the American Osteopathic Association required the gov-
erning board to assume ultimate responsibility for the quality of pa-
tient care rendered in the institution and for the selection of the
medical staff. The medical staff bylaws, approved by the governing
board, contained a similar provision concerning the board's responsi-
bility.32
The court did not dispute the traditional notion that the hospital
could be held vicariously liable for the physician's malpractice only if
it exerted some type of control over the physician. The court found a
significant element of control in the power of the modern hospital
organization to indirectly affect or supervise a staff doctor's pro-
cedures through the threat of suspension or revocation of staff
privileges. It pointed out that hospitals all over the country had re-
view committees to regulate the privileges granted staff doctors and
to insure that privileges were conferred only for those procedures for
which the doctor was qualified. Generally, hospitals restricted or sus-
pended privileges or required supervision when a doctor had de-
monstrated an inability to administer a certain type of treatment or
procedure .3
Finally, the Zimbelman court emphasized the importance of a hos-
pital properly acting upon information it acquires concerning a physi-
cian's competence. Although information concerning two of the prior
lawsuits had been presented to the Department of Surgery, a group
of independent physicians on the professional staff, the department
had not taken any action against Dr. Purcell and had not recom-
mended to the board of trustees that his privileges be restricted or
suspended.3 4 In light of the pertinent accreditation standards and
the professional staff's bylaws, the court ruled that the department
had been negligent,3 5 and that the hospital would be charged with
this negligence and held liable for the resulting injuries.3 6
The widely-publicized case of Gonzales v. Nork & Mercy Hospi-
tals 37 squarely posed the issue of whether a hospital could be found




36. Id. at 95, 500 P.2d at 351. Cf. Jeffcoat v. Phillips, 534 S.W.2d 168, 172-73 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976) (holding that the hospital would not be liable for a negligently performed appendec-
tomy by a nonemployee surgeon since there were no accreditationirequirements that the hospi-
tal's governing authority screen doctors granted hospital privileges, and where the patient's
mother had an on-going relationship with the doctor and knowledge of his performance as a
surgeon, employing him to perform the appendectomy 16 months after he had performed a
similar operation on her daughter).
37. No. 228566 (Super. Ct. of Cal., Sacramento County, filed Nov. 19, 1973).
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liable despite compliance with applicable laws and hospital standards,
such as those promulgated by the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals. In neither Darling nor Zimbelman were the courts faced
with a situation where the hospital had complied with the relevant
statutes and standards. In Gonzales the Superior Court of California
concluded that there could be liability despite good-faith compliance.
The co-defendant, Dr. John Nork, had been trained in orthopedic
surgery and had been practicing in Sacramento six years when the
plaintiff, Albert Gonzales, first visited him complaining of back and
neck pains resulting from a car accident. Dr. Nork performed a
laminectomy on Gonzales which he admitted at trial was unnecessary
and incompetently performed. The operation rendered Gonzales a
partial invalid with chronic back pain and other physical and
psychological difficulties.
Evidence was introduced as to about fifty operations performed by
Dr. Nork on thirty-eight patients. 38 All of these surgeries were un-
necessary or incompetently performed, or both, and most were simi-
lar to the surgery Dr. Nork had performed on the plaintiff. Thirteen
of these operations had antedated Dr. Nork's work on Gonzales.
39
Two of Dr. Nork's other patients had sued him and the hospital prior
to filing of the Gonzales complaint. Generally, Dr. Nork avoided
non-surgical, conservative care, operated on the basis of inadequate
or falsified diagnoses, terrorized and deceived patients to obtain their
consent to surgery, avoided consultation with other doctors and dis-
couraged his patients firom doing so, falsified progress records, and
illustrated a level of technical competence demonstrative of gross ig-
norance. Yet the hospital had no actual knowledge of Dr. Nork's
crippling incompetence or his unethical practices. It was not until
May 1970, when the hospital administrator heard a rumor, sub-
sequently verified, that Dr. Nork's malpractice insurance had been
cancelled, that the hospital prohibited him from operating without
another supervising surgeon present. Nork did not perform further
back surgery at Mercy after June 1970 and soon resigned from the
staff.
The doctor was held liable for compensatory and punitive damages
for conduct that, in the court's words, went "beyond depravity."
40
The hospital raised two defenses to the charge that it could be held
vicariously liable for Dr. Nork's malpractice: first, that it could not be
held responsible for the torts of its independent medical staff; and
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 142.
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second, that it not only conformed to industry standards but went
beyond them. 41
In response, the court ruled that the hospital could be held liable,
regardless of Dr. Nork's status as an independent physician. The fact
that it had complied with its statutory obligation to have a medical
staff that was self-governing and independent did not immunize it
from liability. The governing board was ultimately responsible for as-
suring that the methods employed by the staff, whether or not com-
posed of independent physicians, reasonably could be relied upon to
uncover and prevent a doctor's malpractice. 42  The hospital's com-
pliance with Joint Commission standards requiring it, through its
medical staff, to operate a system of peer review of treatment would
not provide immunity either. "Here Mercy cannot be said to have
reasonably relied on its medical staff to detect fraud, because the
'peer review' of its staff was incapable of detecting fraud." 43 Further,
the hospital had negligently failed to utilize information available to
it, indicating risks to Dr. Nork's patients. In the instance of one pa-
tient, Arthur Freer, Dr. Nork had reported a postoperative complica-
tion to the hospital, and the patient had sued him and the hospital in
June 1963. The case was voluntarily dismissed shortly thereafter. But
no proper review of the surgery was made. In another case, the hos-
pital's pathologist (retained by contract) failed to report his findings,
as was required under the medical staff bylaws, concerning nerve fib-
ers excised by Dr. Nork during surgery. His analysis indicated a dis-
crepancy between the postoperative diagnosis and the preoperative
diagnosis offered by Dr. Nork. During another laminectomy, a spe-
cially-trained assistant was medically necessary and required under
the hospital's Department of Surgery rules and regulations to hold
the nerve root retractor under the procedure being followed. Instead,
a surgical nurse was left to substitute, but no notation of the
41. Id. at 143. Before the court issued its findings the hospital settled with the plaintiff for
$500,000 and did not appeal the judgment against it. Gonzales v. Nork, 60 Cal. App.3d 738,
131 Cal. Rptr. 717, 718 n.1 (1976). See also Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship:
Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REv. 385, 415 n. 153 (1976).
42. Gonzales v. Nork & Mercy Hosps., No. 228566 (Super. Ct. of Cal., Sacramento County,
filed Nov. 19, 1973), slip op. at 154-61.
43. Id. at 164. In particular, the Joint Commission system was criticized because it was: (1)
predicated on the assumption that the doctor was reporting honestly and accurately; (2) subjec-
tive according to the personal standards of the reviewer; (3) random, bad cases being picked up
only by chance; (4) infrequent; (5) uncritical and rushed; (6) made without a comparison of the
doctor's progress records and nurses' notes; (7) completed without a protocol or profile of the
doctor's deficiencies being made so that no common fund of knowledge was available to the
hospital; and (8) performed in an atmosphere of hostility, with one witness referring to the social




improper departure was made by the surgical supervising nurse, a
hospital employee. 44
Writing for the court, Judge Abbott Goldberg concluded:
The hospital has a duty to protect its patients from malpractice
by members of its medical staff when it knows or should have
known that malpractice was likely to be committed upon them.
Mercy Hospital had no actual knowledge of Dr. Nork's propensity
to commit malpractice, but it was negligent in not knowing. It was
negligent in not knowing, because it did not have a system for
acquiring knowledge; it did not use the knowledge available to it
properly; it failed to investigate the Freer case, which would have
given it knowledge; and it cannot excuse itself on the ground that
its medical staff did not inform it ....
I have reached the conclusion that the hospital is liable with
great reluctance, because I am sure that the Sisters of Mercy have
done everything within their power to run a proper institution. But
they, like every hospital governing board, are corporately respon-
sible for the conduct of their medical staff .... Mercy is a culprit,
but it is also a victim. 45
It is significant that in Darling, Zimbelnan, and Gonzales strict
liability was not imposed upon the hospitals for the failings of their
medical staff. That is, the hospitals were not held liable regardless of
whether they had mechanisms for reviewing and monitoring the
selection, retention, and activities of hospital personnel. 46 Instead,
liability was imposed where the hospitals had what the courts deemed
inadequate means for detecting practices that might lead to patient
injuries, and for taking prompt action upon information they had con-
cerning actual or potential risks to a patient's health. These cases, in
addition to numerous others, suggest that a hospital has a duty (1) to
acquire and (2) to use information regarding risk-creating activities of
hospital personnel and that it will be liable for patient injuries when
it breaches this duty. 47 It is this two-fold duty involving both the
44. Id. at 187-93.
45. Id. at 194-95.
46. Cf. Cunningham v. MacNeal Mem. Hosp., 47 ll.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970) (hospi-
tal strictly liable for injury caused by blood transfusion infected with serum hepatitis). See also
McDonald v. Sacramento Med. Fdn. Blood Bk., 62 Cal. App.3d 866, 868-72, 133 Cal. Rptr.
444, 445-57 (1976) (California statute defining blood transfusion as a service rather than as a sale
shielded blood donors and suppliers of contaminated blood from imposition of strict liability;
statutory rule adopted in 42 states).
47. For example, in Keene v. Methodist Hosp., 324 F. Supp. 233, 234-35 (N.D. Ind. 1971),
a hospital was held liable for the negligent failure of an employee radiologist to bring to the
attention of the attending physician, emergency room staff, or hospital administration the possi-
bility of a patient's skull fracture and the need for further X-rays. The court noted that transmit-
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acquisition and use of knowledge that provides the basis for hospital
corporate accountability and necessitates the establishment of some
form of risk-reporting and injury prevention mechanism.
tal of the information would probably have resulted in surgery preventing the brain damage that
caused death. Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc., v. Misevech, 113 Ariz. 34, 36, 545 P.2d 958, 960 (1976)
contained the dictum that if the medical staff was negligent in the exercise of its duty to super-
vise its members or in failing to recommend action to the hospital's governing body prior to
patient's injury, the hospital may be liable. Mundt v. Alta Bates Hosp., 223 Cal. App.2d 413,
422-24, 35 Cal. Rptr. 848, 854-55 (1963), indicated that a hospital would be liable where the
evidence was clearly sufficient to support the finding that, among other things, hospital nurses
were derelict in their duty to observe the patient's leg and promptly report all unfavorable
symptoms to the doctor in charge. Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 1-5,
186 S.E.2d 307, 308-09 (1971),aff'd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972) imposed liability on a
county hospital for negligent failure to require satisfactory proof of professional qualifications of
staff physician. The fact that the doctor was licensed under Georgia law and recommended by
other doctors on staff was insufficient to overcome allegation of hospital's negligence since hospi-
tal authorities knew or should have known that doctor was incompetent and unskilled. In Pettis
v. State Dept. of Hosp., 336 So.2d 521, 529-32 (La. App. 1976), aff'd as to liability issue, 337
So.2d 527 (La. 1976), a state mental hospital was held liable for failure of nurses and attendants
to inform doctors of patient's complaints of back and shoulder pain after receiving the first two
electroconvulsive therapy treatments; a third and fourth set of shock treatments aggravated or
caused injuries. Greenstein v. Meister, 279 Md. 301, 368 A.2d 451, 458-61 (1977), involved a
post-operative patient with the following symptoms: rising pulse rate, persistent complaints of
abnormal and excessive pain at site of bone graft, unusual swelling at site, complaints of feeling
hot, excessive restlessness, elevated temperature, yelrowish cast. The surgeon performing the
graft informed the attending physician of symptoms and deceased's wife told the house physi-
cian of elevated temperature and other conditions. Antibiotics administered after delay were too
late to save patient's life, and the hospital was held liable. In Kakligan v. Henry Ford Hosp., 48
Mich. App. 325, 329-33, 210 N.W.2d 463, 466-67 (1973) a violation of regulation promulgated
by State Health Commission requiring a written hospital policy denoting when consultation
should be held and recording of consultation was evidence of negligent procedure. The hospital
in Hull v. North Valley Hosp., 159 Mont. 375, 388-91, 498 P.2d 136, 143-44 (1972), was not
liable for staff surgeon's negligence in performing knee operation where the surgeon was not
employed by it, where the hospital had no knowledge that a particular act of malpractice might
occur, and where it reasonably relied upon information provided by its internal reviewing and
monitoring process regulating the admission, conduct, and practice of medical staff. The Mon-
tana court noted, however, that the standards of hospital accreditation, state licensing regula-
tions, and the hospital's bylaws indicated that the medical profession and other authorities re-
gard it as desirable and feasible that hospitals assume certain responsibilities for patient care,
and that the modern hospital's attempt to fulfill these duties is evidenced by the existence of
the various boards, reviewing committees, and designations of privileges whose purpose is to
control, supervise, and review the work within the hospital. In Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Mem.
Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 90-94, 173 N.W.2d 881, 881-84 (1970), there was a failure to take the history of
a pregnant mother before delivery and failure by an intern to notify the attending physician of
the patient's deteriorating condition some hours after childbirth; taking these steps probably
would have led to treatment preventing the patient's death from massive "strep" infection.
Violations of standards and regulations fixed by Nebraska State Department of Health and such
organizations as the American Hospital Association were held admissible as proof of negligence.
In Corleto v. Shore Mem. Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 305-12, 350 A.2d 534, 536-39 (1975), a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action was denied where the complaint named
the hospital, its board of directors, administrator, medical staff, and the treating doctor as de-
fendants. There was an allegation that, among others, the medical staff knew or should have
known that treating doctor was incompetent to perform a particular abdominal surgical proce-
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In many instances, the only way a hospital can acquire and use
information concerning risks to patient safety is to implement formally
an internal system designed to accomplish this end. The history of
malpractice litigation is replete with examples of situations in which
hospitals had available information indicating a possible risk to pa-
tients but either did not act upon it, or acted only after it was too late
to avert the injury that gave rise to the suit. Of course, a structured
system designed to detect and respond to risk-creating situations will
not prevent all patient injuries from occurring. Nevertheless, such a
program probably will result in fewer injuries than reliance upon an
unstructured, informal system of information gathering.
Among the factors to be examined by a hospital when designing
and evaluating its program to prevent patient injuries are: procedures
for loss control programs outlined in various manuals and studies on
the subject; 48 accrediting association standards and guidelines; 49
practices and precautions required by a hospital's bylaws, manuals,
dure. Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 414-15, 227 N.E.2d 296, 299 (1967), concerned a
failure by a nonemployee surgeon to obtain informed consent to spinal jack operation. The court
said that the hospital would not be liable for an omission to act unless it had reason to know
that it should have acted within the duty it concededly had. In Stack v. Wapner, 368 A.2d 292,
294, 300 (Pa. Super. 1976), a patient received an intravenous injection of a drug used to induce
labor by causing contractions of uterus. The labor room chart contained no notation that ad-
ministration of the drug was constantly monitored as was required by current medical practice.
Evidence supported the finding that failure to monitor administration of the drug led to heavy
intrauterine bleeding and subsequent chain of events; patient underwent total hysterectomy and
received blood transfusions, contracted infectious hepatitis, and received medication for
hepatitis which resulted in partial hearing loss in both ears; nonemployee physicians and hospi-
tal liable. Tonsic v. Wagner, 220 Pa. Super. 468, 479-83, 289 A.2d 138, 143-45 (1972) (dissent-
ing opinion), involved an attack upon hospital's failure to formulate rules and regulations gov-
erning standard procedure in operating room; clamp left in patient's abdomen after colectomy
operation where no instrument count was taken, rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 458 Pa.
246, 329 A.2d 497 (1974). Sparger v. Worley Hosp., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977), imposed
liability for injuries resulting from employee nurses' failure to remove a sponge from patient's
abdominal cavity after an operation, when the correct procedures for sponge count were de-
tailed in hospital's policy and procedure manual; chief operating surgeon not liable.
48. FEDERATION OF AMERICAN HOSPITALS, RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL (1977); MARY-
LAND HOSPITAL EDUCATION INSTITUTE, CONTROLLING HOSPITAL LIABILITY: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH (1976); J. Ashby, Jr. & S. Pearson, A STUDY OF HOSPITAL PATIENT INJURY PRE-
VENTION PROGRAMS. See also the special issues devoted to malpractice prevention, 51 HOSPI-
TALS 53-74 (May 16, 1977); 10 FED. AM. Hosp. REV. 13-42 (1977); and Goldsmith & Bertolet,
In-Hospital Malpractice Prevention Program, 4 J. LEG. MED. 11 (Sept. 1976).
49. See, e.g., JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1976) and SUPPLEMENT TO ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOS-
PITALS (1977); C. JACOBS & N. JACOBS, THE PEP PRIMER: THE JCAH PERFORMANCE EVAL-




rules, regulations, and resolutions; 50 federal statutes, regulations and
guidelines; 51 state statutes requiring hospital loss control programs, 52
50. See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972) (hospital's pro-
fessional staff bylaws put into evidence on issue of standard of care); Gonzales v. Nork & Mercy
Hosps., No. 228566 (Super. Ct. of Cal., Sacramento County, filed Nov. 19, 1973), slip op. at
190-93 (pathologist's violation of reporting requirements of medical staff bylaws, and employee
nurse's failure to report surgeon's departure in violation of Department of Surgery rules and
regulations, held to constitute negligence); Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 33
Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965) (hospital held not to have conformed to the requirements
established by its bylaws). See also Stack v. Wapner, 368 A.2d 292, 297 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976)
(official hospital policy mandating patient chart entries when drug used to induce labor submit-
ted into evidence); Sparger v. Worley Hosp., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977) (hospital but not the
chief operating surgeon held liable for injuries resulting from employee nurse's failure to re-
move a sponge from the patient's abdominal cavity after an operation; noted that the procedures
for sponge count detailed in the hospital's policy and procedure manual not followed). Cf. Les-
coe, Regulation of Health Care by Medical Staff Bylaws, 5 J. LEG. MED. 17, No. 2 (Feb. 2,
1977).
51. See, e.g., Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976)
(codified in scattered sections of 15, 21 U.S.C.) (relevant regulations appearing in various sec-
tions of 21 C.F.R. and 45 C.F.R. 99 1840.1-1840.7 (1976)); Social Security Amendments of
1972, Tit. II, § 249F(b), 42 U.S.C. 99 1320c to 1320c-19 (Supp. V 1975) (establishing unified
national professional standards review organization (PSRO) program designed to conduct utiliza-
tion review and to insure that medical care given to covered federal aid recipients is medically
necessary and meets professionally recognized standards of quality of care); 42 C.F.R. 9§
101.1-101.2106 (1976) (PSRO regulations); OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REVIEW,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE PSRO PROGRAM MANUAL (1974); see also
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, SAMPLE CRITERIA FOR
SHORT STAY -HOSPITAL REVIEW: SAMPLE CRITERIA TO ASSIST PSROS IN QUALITY ASSURANCE
(1976); Medicare Amendments to the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §9 426, 1395-139511
(1970), as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395b-1 to 1395pp (Supp. V 1975); (20 C.F.R. 9 405.1011 to
405.1040) (1977) (medicare conditions of provider participation).
In particular, 20 C.F.R. § 405.451 (1977) states generally that all payments to providers must
be for reasonable costs related to patient care. In response to the development of self-insurance
programs by many hospitals during 1976, the Social Security Administration promulgated cer-
tain standards to clarify which self-insurance costs were reasonable and related to patient care
and which, therefore, would be reimbursable under § 405.451. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE PROVIDER REIMBRUSEMENT MANUAL, PART 1 §§ 2162-2162.13 (re-
visions effective April 1, 1977). Under § 2162.7(c) a provider will not be able to obtain reim-
bursement for self-insurance costs unless it has "an adequate risk management program to
examine the cause of lossers and to take action to reduce the frequency and severity of them."
The program must have the essential characteristics of programs required by insurers currently
providing coverage against malpractice risks. "Therefore, a provider must have an ongoing
safety program, professional and employee training programs, etc., to minimize the frequency
and severity of malpractice and comprehensive general patient liability incidents."
See also the several law review articles discussing the extent to which physician compliance
with the civil immunity clause of the PSRO amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. V
1975), immunizes the doctor and hospital from liability; Comment, PSRO: Malpractice Liability
and the Impact of the Civil Immunity Clause, 62 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1505-13 (1974); Note, Feder-
ally Imposed Self-Regulation of Medical Practice: A Critique of the Professional Standards Re-
view Organization, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 837-42 (1974); Note, The Professional Stan-
dards Review Organizaton: Its Impact on Medical Litigation, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 443.
52. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 19.20.075 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.41
(West Supp. 1977), declared unconstitutional in The Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Under-
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and other statutes, regulations, 53 and administrative determina-
tions. 54  In attempting to establish a program that conforms to the
writing Association v. Shevin, No. 76-2792 (Leon County, Fla., Feb. 28, 1977); R. I. GEN.
LAWS. § 23-16-4 (Supp. 1976). The Rhode Island statute is typical of the three and indicates the
basic elements of any malpractice prevention effort:
Every hospital license[d] in this state and its insurance carrier shall cooperatively as
part of their administrative functions establish an internal risk management pro-
gram, which shall include at least the following components:
(1) an in-hospital grievance or complaint mechanism designed to process and resolve as
promptly and effectively as possible grievances by patients or their representatives re-
lated to incidents, billing, adequacies in treatment, and other factors known to influence
malpractice claims and suits. Such mechanism shall include appointment of a representa-
tive accountable to the hospital administration who shall anticipate and monitor on a
day-to-day basis such grievances and administer said mechanism;
(2) the continuous collection of data by each hospital with respect to its negative health
care outcomes (whether or not they give rise to claims), patient grievances, claims, suits,
professional liability premiums, settlements, awards allocated and administrative costs of
claims handling, costs of patient injury preventive and safety engineering activities, and
other relevant statistics and information;
(3) medical care evaluation mechanisms, which shall include but not be limited to,
tissue committees or medical audit committees, to review the appropriateness of proce-
dures performed, to periodically assess the quality of medical care being provided at the
institution and to pass on the necessity of surgery;
(4) education programs for the hospital's staff personnel engaged in patient care ac-
tivities dealing with patient safety, medical injury prevention, the legal aspects of patient
care, problems of communication and rapport with patients, and other relevant factors
known to influence malpractice claims and suits.
Cf. Asuz. REV. STAT. § 36-445 (Supp. 1977) (review of professional practices by medical staff
required in order to improve patient care); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 11.692 (Supp. 1977) (state
Board of Health shall publish recommendations for hospital in-service training programs de-
signed to reduce malpractice claims).
53. In Illinois, see, e.g., Abortion Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-11 to -19 (1975); Birth
Control Services for Minors Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.7 (1975); Consent to Medical,
Dental, or Surgical Procedure Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 18.1-.5 (1975), as amended (Supp.
1976); Emergency Medical Treatment Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, §§ 86-87 (1975), as
amended (Supp. 1976); Hospital Licensing Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, §§ 142-157 (1975),
as amended (Supp. 1976); ILL. DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH, HOSPITAL LICENSINC ACT AN)
REQUIREMENTS (1976); Medical Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 1-16 y (1975) as
amended (Supp. 1976); Nursing Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 35.32-.57 (1975), as amended
(Supp. 1976); Physician's Assistants Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 211-229 (1975);
Public Aid Code, Art. V. Medical Assistance, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 5-5 (1975), as amended
(Supp. 1976); Required Uterine Cancer Test Statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 55.31 (1975).
See generally, Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 64 Ill.2d 380, 389-93, 356 N.E.2d 93, 97-98 (1976).
This suit was brought by an oil bulk dealer against an oil company for injuries sustained in
explosion which occurred after the dealer overfilled tanks of a service station. The court ruled
that violation of administrative rules, regulations, and orders designed to protect human life or
property should be considered prima facie evidence of negligence when they are validly
adopted and have force of law. It stated that administrative regulations such as those promul-
gated by the Department of Law Enforcement, Division of Fire Prevention, are the result of an
agency's expertise and are relevant evidence of applicable standards of care, and in so doing
cited the Darling case.
54. Cf. Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 Div.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 122, 130 (Sup.Ct. 1976) (recom-
mendation of medical malpractice medication panel that no malpractice involved could be ad-
mitted into evidence in suit against physician and hospital).
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applicable standard of care, the hospital may choose among a number
of alternative approaches. Some of the issues that a hospital should
consider are raised in recent books and journal articles on hospital
loss control. 55 The discussion which follows examines five of the
most significant issues that program planners should resolve.
Focus and Commitment
Potential liability for patient injuries is but one of the risks a hospi-
tal must consider in its risk management program. 56  Other risks in-
clude potential damage to or loss of hospital property or business
57
and potential liability for injuries to hospital personnel and visitors.5"
Focusing upon the problems of safety generally may help to eliminate
risks common to patients, visitors, and employees (for example: un-
covered needles left in rooms, wet or slippery floors, inadequate fire
prevention and security measures) and will promote the development
and utilization of procedures such as incident reporting. In short,
coordination and integration of all aspects of hospital safety and se-
curity will enhance the protection afforded to patients, visitors and
hospital personnel.
Another important question is the relationship between the loss re-
duction program and the hospital's quality assurance efforts. Already,
many hospitals conduct internal assessments, audits, and reviews of
the quality of care. 59 The procedures used in these programs will
resemble and, in some cases, overlap with those used in loss control
programs, but the emphasis in loss control is patient care improve-
ment in order to minimize legal liability. In other words, the em-
phasis is upon the reduction or stabilization of hospital costs. As is
true of the defensive diagnostic and treatment procedures ordered by
55. See note 48 supra.
56. RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 5-54.
57. MED. MALPRACTICE LAW, supra note 5, at 189-96.
58. Safety and reporting requirements are imposed upon hospitals by the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1-1910.1500
(1976) (OSHA standards). For a discussion of the special problems a hospital faces in creating a
proper working environment for its employees, see generally, Bertz, diMonda, & Sprague,
Viewing the Hospital as a Working Environment, 50 HOSPITALS 107, 109-112 (Oct. 16, 1976).
Cf. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE VII HOSPITAL OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SERVICES STUDY (1976).
59. Brook, Williams & Avery, Quality Assurance in the 20th Century: Will it Lead to Im-
proved Health in the 21st?, in QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HEALTH CARE 1-29 (B. Egdahl & P.
Certman eds. 1976); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, AS-
SESSING QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE: AN EVALUATION 25-55 (1976); Brook, Brutoro, & Wil-




doctors to protect themselves against malpractice liability, patient
care is being evaluated primarily from a legal or financial, rather than
medical or scientific, perspective. 60  In some instances, however,
there may be a conflict between finance and science. For example,
Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center, in Chicago, recalled
thousands of former patients who had received X-ray irradiation
treatments many years before for infected tonsils and a variety of
other disorders. Subsequent to the treatments, scientists had discov-
ered that the irradiation led to a significant increase in susceptibility
to thyroid cancer. The decision to recall was made, although providing
notice to the patients might alert them to a possible cause of action.
To date, however, there have been no successful suits against the
hospital. 6 '
Finally, the hospital must obtain participation, acceptance, and
compliance with the program at all levels of its organization. Darling
v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital provides a good illustra-
tion of liability imposed because ot, among other reasons, the failure
to promptly review and report a patient's deteriorating condition. The
architects of the hospital's program should stress that knowledge of
risk-creating situations before they produce grounds for a lawsuit is
the key to a successful system. In short, the ultimate success of any
malpractice prevention program depends on the commitment of hos-
pital personnel to reporting risks to patient safety. The importance of
their commitment to the information gathering aspect of the program
cannot be overemphasized.
Administrative Organization
A preliminary consideration in the implementation and organization
of a loss control program is where control of the program will lie.
There are numerous possibilities for centralizing responsibility. The
hospital administrator, chief executive officer, a general assistant ad-
ministrator, or specially designated risk reduction officer on the
medical staff would be a logical choice. Hospital-wide committees,
such as a board of trustees task force or a hospital-wide risk reduction
committee composed of representatives from hospital management,
medical staff, nursing staff, and legal counsel could be responsible.
Finally, departmental liability control committees in, for example, the
emergency room, operating rooms, and outpatient care facilities
might head the organizational effort.
60. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 4, at 38-40.
61. Kotulak, Thyroid Tests: No Cover-up, Chi. Tribune, Mar. 13, 1977, at 26, cols. 3-5.
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One problem a hospital may face in delineating authority is conflict
between the hospital administration and medical staff since the latter
is usually reluctant to permit.any administrative supervision of physi-
cian services in areas requiring medical judgnen t. 62 An additional
question is whether responsibility for the hospital's entire risk man-
agement plan should be centralized in a risk reduction committee or
risk manager, who would be responsible for administering and super-
vising the hospital's safety and security program, the settlement and
litigation of pending claims, and the purchase of insurance for injury
to patients, visitors, and employees and damages to the physical plant
and premises.
Risk Detection
Most hospitals utilize incident reports to document patient injuries
or risk-creating situations. But these may be an inadequate source if
physician-related or other types of incidents and risks are rarely re-
ported in this way. Additional sources include (1) existing hospital
systems, such as product review (standards) committee, patient rep-
resentatives, pharmacy committee, infection committee, tissue com-
mittee, medical records, medical audit, nursing audit, utilization re-
view, continuing medical education, hospital training and educati6n
programs; (2) patient complaints; (3) legal counsel; (4) insurance
agents or claims adjusters; (5) malpractice summarizations and other
information showing the type of incident or injury giving rise to the
lawsuit against the hospital, patient diagnosis, cause of incident, per-
sonnel involved, disposition of claim, and damages awarded; and (6)
solicited and unsolicited comments of hospital personnel.
The information obtained may be used to form an internal data
base, and may be compared with external data to assess which proce-
dures, treatments, and areas of the hospital are creating the greatest
risk of liability. Ten or even five years ago there were no external
sources based on large samples detailing the incidents of particular
practices or procedures giving rise to malpractice claims since the
credible data in insurer files were not systematically analyzed or
widely disseminated. 63 But quite recently the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners compiled nationwide data on individual
malpractice claims closed between July 1, 1975 and July 1, 1976, and
62. Williams, The Quandary of the Hospital Administrator in Dealing with the Medical
Malpractice Problem, 55 NEB. L. REV. 401, 403-11 (1976).
63. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 4, at 2.
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published the data in three of four planned quarterly summaries be-
fore the eflbrt was stopped for lack of funding. 64
The last summary contains an analysis of 12,918 malpractice claim
reports reported to the Insurance Commissioners through May 3,
1976.65 In cases in which indemnity was equal to or less than
$100,000, claims against physicians and surgeons constituted 60 per-
cent of claims paid by count and 71 percent by amount; claims against
hospitals accounted for 35 percent of paid claims by count and 26
percent by anount.6 6  Yet hospitals and emergency rooms were the
site of 70 percent of all claims and 84 percent of indemnity dollars. 67
The summary noted:
This suggests that most malpractice claims arise from procedures
performed by physicians in a hospital facility and result in the
physician being named as primary defendant .... In many of the
cases, the physician is held liable for the injury, and the claim
against the hospital is closed without payment.6 8
For the claim reports covered by the last summary, there is other
data useful in designing a malpractice prevention program: the per-
centage of all claims paid and total indemnity paid according to physi-
cian or surgeon speciality,69 the final diagnosis for which treatment
was sought or rendered, 70 the operation, diagnostic, or treatment
procedures leading to the claim, 71 the frequency with which opera-
tion, diagnostic or treatment procedures named in the claims caused
injury, 72 and the health care practitioners and hospital employees
contributing to or associated with the injury though not named as
defendants. 73
64. Groves, Taking Steps for Safety's Sake, 51 HOSPITALS 60, 61 (May 16, 1977).
65. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 3 (Sept. 1976).
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 14.
68. Id. Cf. I NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS at 10, 12 (Apr.
1976), 1 NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS at 19, 22 (Dec. 1976) for
similar data concerning the relative importance of physician-related incidents in suits brought
against hospitals.
69. 1 NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS at 13 (Sept. 1976).
70. Id. at 16-25.
71. Id. at 26-37.
72. Id. at 54 (procedural errors alleged in 83 percent of paid incidents and 88 percent of
total indemnity paid; respective percentages for diagnostic errors being 31 percent and 40 per-
cent; data excludes cases of indemnity above $100,000).
73. Id. at 56. For additional statistical studies dealing with patient injuries based on smaller
samples, see INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL
MALPRACTICE REVIEW: 1974 CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY (1976); MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT
APPENDIX, supra note 4, at 1-37, 41-70, 623-36.
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Injury and Liability Prevention
Risks can be evaluated according to the potential liability they
create and their frequency. Once the hospital has determined the
severity of the potential liability arising from various risks it can take
measures to reduce those risks that it feels will be the most damag-
ing, financially and otherwise, to the hospital. These measures in-
clude immediate corrective or preventive action, continuing educa-
tion or retraining programs for the personnel involved, 74 required
safety orientation programs for all new employees and physicians, in-
struction on the use of forms to report patient injuries or risk situa-
tions, display of' safety information on bulletin boards and in newslet-
ters, and changes in criteria for admission to the medical or nursing
staff. These are general injury prevention approaches. More specific
solutions may be called for in light of incident reports or malpractice
suits. These include counseling of personnel involved, disciplinary ac-
tion, in-house education programs directed to specific personnel,
changes in procedures or practices, or purchase of' new equipment.
Further, good hospital-patient communications may enable patients to
express their frustration and anger with hospital procedures. The ab-
sence of good communications may make legal action the only vehicle
available to patients for expression of dissatisfaction and resolution of
grievances.
Monitoring and Evaluation
Cost-benefit analysis can be performed, looking at such variables as
the number of incidents reported and claims filed, the total liability
insurance premiums paid, the total liability-related payments per ad-
mission, and the total administrative costs of the program per admis-
sion. Such statistics tend to itemize and quantify the benefits of the
program as compared to its costs. To help evaluate or initiate a pro-
gram, the hospital may want to contract for the services of competent
hospital risk management consultants. But a hospital should be
cautioned that, at this point, many of the risk management consulting
firms are reputed to provide inadequate services. 75  Another source
of guidance is the insurance industry. Many major malpractice insur-
74. See, e.g., American Hospital Association, Dare to Care: Reducing the Risk of Institu-
tional Malpractice (1976) (package multimedia program for continuing education, in-service
training, and employee orientation focusing on potential risk situations that can occur in hospi-
tals); E. BERNZWEIG, THE NURSE'S LIABILITY FOR MALPRACTICE (2d ed. 1975) (programmed
text designed for use by nurses).
75. MALPRACTICE AND INSURANCE DIGEST 4 (No. 13, Jan. 1977).
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ers survey covered hospitals, conduct seminars, and generally assist
clients with their problems in patient injury prevention. 76
CONCLUDING REMARKS
There is reason to believe that a patient loss control program will
result in fewer injuries and lower costs. Analogous programs in the
employee safety area have resulted in lower accident rates and re-
duced workmen's compensation premiums. For example, this was
true under hospital programs sponsored by the Ohio Hospital Associ-
ation. 77 But regardless of the premium savings that might result, a
hospital should be aware of the legal or evidentiary implications of a
failure to institute a program designed to monitor and review the
institution's quality of care. Both the case law and the widespread
adoption of loss prevention programs in the hospital industry suggest
the importance of having a malpractice prevention program. Tes-
timony that a hospital has no reasonably effective, systematic program
for acquiring and acting upon knowledge of risks to patients created
by hospital personnel may be strong evidence, in malpractice litiga-
tion, that the hospital did not conform to the requisite standard of
care. Accordingly, malpractice prevention becomes important not
only as a means to enhance patient care, but also as a defensive mnea-
sure significant because of its evidentiary implications.
76. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT APPENDIX, supra note 4, at 564-65, 567-68, 571,
577-79, 585, 596, 599.
77. Carter & Egan, State's Safety Plan Lowers Insurance Costs, 105 THE MODERN Hos-
PITAL 78 (1965).
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